A review of agricultural policies in independent Togo (1960-2015)

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Various agricultural policies have been undertaken by Togolese policymakers since independence to respond to food insecurity issues. This study aims at reviewing these policies for better orientation of future agricultural policies. The green revolution policy launched in 1977 could have resulted in the upswing of the Togolese agriculture sector and a shift towards modernization and market orientation. Unfortunately, the weakness of institutions in charge of implementation, and inefficiency in management led to its failure. The liberalization policy that advocates the gradual reduction of agricultural support came to strengthen the economy. Non-evidence based policy making, the social unrest and the political environment led to the collapse of investment opportunities and the failure of liberalization policy. The Government must look at its investment share and review the competitiveness of some sectors like cotton, coffee and cocoa. The processing of cash and tuber crops has to be encouraged through the capacity building of farmers and research institutions.

Key words: Agriculture, policies, Togo.

INTRODUCTION

Ensuring food security, generating income and improving welfare of communities is the common objectives of any public policy. To meet the target, there is a need to rethink the development models being implemented, and reorient economic and social reforms (Breisinger et al., 2010).

Togolese policymakers believe that developing the agriculture sector would move the people out of extreme poverty. Various agricultural sector policies have been implemented since independence with the goal of modernizing and increasing the contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and poverty reduction, as well as improvements in the well-being of the entire population, particularly in rural areas. In Togo, for example, the agricultural sector employs 54.1% of the population and contributes about 42% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 20% of the value of exports (FAO, 2015; AfDB et al., 2016). Cereal production in Togo has contributed about 68.5% of agricultural GDP, making it a major component of the agriculture sector (FAO, 2015).

Although the level of production of cereals has recently increased, Togo records a low level of productivity in terms of the ratio of cereal production per capita, compared to neighbouring countries (such as Burkina Faso and Mali) with similar economic and agricultural characteristics. For instance, the average cereal production per capita in Togo was only 172 kilograms, while it reached 268 kilograms and 400 kilograms in Burkina–Faso and Mali, respectively (Mindi and Kougbenya, 2012). Ntagungira (2016) has indicated also that, despite the Togolese agricultural labour force (12 times more agricultural labour than Switzerland), the productivity of cereals per hectare in Togo is six times lower than Switzerland cereals’ productivity. Cereal productivity in Togo is about 1.2 tons per hectare compared to 1.4 tons per hectare in Sub-Saharan Africa and 5.4 tons per hectare in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development–OEDC countries (Ntagungira, 2016). Cereal production in Togo in 2010 was only 1.06 million tons while it was about 2.91 million tons in Ghana, 4.54 million tons in Burkina Faso, and 6.34 million tons in Mali (Mindi and Kougbenya, 2012). The low level of agricultural production led to increased expenditure on food imports during the past fifteen years. For instance, in 2014,
Togo's expenditure on food imports reached 185 million United States Dollars (USD), while it was only 36 million USD in 2000 (FAO, 2015). In 2015, cereals imports in Togo represented 25% of food imports in Togo (Ntagungira, 2016). Why this gap in food production and what are policymakers' responses? It has become imperative to review these policies and attempt to explain the reasons behind their failure. This would inform policymakers on the effectiveness of the implemented policies and provide guidance for the future policies.

This paper highlights the diverse agricultural policies undertaken by Togolese policymakers between 1960 and 2015 by answering the following questions: What are the past and current economic and agricultural conditions in Togo? What agricultural policies have been implemented to respond to food security issues since independence? Which policy worked, which did not work and what can we learn from them?

We briefly present an historical and economic overview of Togo in the first section, followed by the general aspects of Togolese agriculture. Then, different agricultural and agro-food trade policies undertaken by Togolese policymakers are presented in section four, and section five highlights the lessons learnt. Section six concludes this paper.

**Brief historical and economic overview of Togo**

Togo is a small country in West Africa with an area of 56,700 Km2 and with roughly 6.2 million inhabitants in 2010. It lies mostly between latitude 6° and 11°N and longitude 0° and 2°E. It is bordered on the North by Burkina Faso, the Atlantic Ocean on the South, Benin on the East and Ghana on the West (Figure 1).

Togo was an old colony of Deutschland (Germany today) and became a trusteeship under the league of nations after the First World War and administrated by France and British. The British trusteeship voted to join Ghana at Ghana independence and Togo under France rule after losing much of its territories to Ghana. Togo got its political independence from France on April 27, 1960 and has since been governed by a single political party, Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais (RPT). It became a member of Food and Agriculture Organization of United Nation (FAO) on May 23, 1960.

The average annual growth of population over the period of 1960 to 2011 is estimated at 2.9%. Togo’s formal education rate reached 62% with 53.5% of women and was ranked 166th out of 167 countries in 2013 based on the Human Development Index of United Nation Development Program (UNDP, 2014). UNDP (2014) has also indicated that in term of Gender Inequality Index, Togo is ranked 127th out of 149 countries.

About, 74.5% of Togolese population live on less than USD$3 a day (AfDB et al., 2016). The country is part of the West African and Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU) that shares the same monetary policy. The local currency is Franc CFA (Franc de la Communauté Financière d’Afrique) which is in fixed parity with “Franc Français” since 1960 and with Euro since January 1st, 1999 (1Euro=655.957 FCFA). Phosphate is the major national mining product. Togo is ranked as the fourth largest world phosphate producer. The average annual economic growth is estimated at 5.30% in recent years (AfDB et al., 2016). The average annual GDP per capita was USD$274.7 while that of the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita was USD$268.44. Between 1980 and 2010, Togo experienced very low economic growth as there was low investment in agriculture sector which happens to be the dominant sector. The average annual growth rate of GDP was 1.96%. With that rate, it seems to be difficult, even impossible to achieve the target associated with the first objective of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that eradication of extreme poverty and hunger by 2015. Figure 2 shows the growth of national annual real GDP of Togo from 1960 to 2015.

The year after political independence, the average annual economic growth was only 3.7%, but increased rapidly after the first coup d’État in 1963 and reached on average 15% in 1965. It declined continuously from 1966 to 1975, a period during which Togo observed a major drought in its history due to bad climate conditions. This led to the launching of the green revolution policy on April 7, 1977.

The net impact was positive before the end of the five year period of the green revolution, but started to decline due to the failure of the green revolution initiative. In fact, in 1982, a great misappropriation of funds that was devoted to finance agriculture sector was discovered while it was the most promising sector on which policymakers relied to end poverty in Togo (Schwartz, 1989). The decline in economic growth during this period can be explained by the failure of many projects undertaken. The period between 1980 and 1984 coincides also with the high oil price in the oil producing countries. Togo, a price taker of various imported products, was affected negatively with the high oil price crisis. The period between 1990 and 1993 coincides with great socio-political turmoil in Togo; the period of democratization. The nine month general strike in 1992 paralyzed the Togolese economy resulting in the loss of many jobs and an increase in the unemployment rate. These events seriously affected the general economic conditions, as can be observed in the trend of real GDP growth in these years (Figure 2). A high economic growth was observed in 1994. It is probably due to the direct effect of devaluation of the local currency (Franc CFA). From 2002 to 2011, the average annual growth of GDP has been positive but seems to be constant. It can be explained by the various climatic shocks such us floods that damaged bridges and roads, destroyed crops and damaged habitats (AfDB, 2011). The typical example is the flooding events in 2008 where 38,209 farmers were affected including 18,249 women and 24,956 hectares or 56% of planted areas that were destroyed and the total cost of agricultural damage during this flood event was estimated at 11 billion of FCFA

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1 These amounts are constant 2000 dollars
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**General aspects of Togolese agriculture**

Togolese economy is largely dominated by agricultural activities and services sector contributing respectively on
average about 42% and 34% of GDP with only 21% by industry sector (AfDB, 2011; FAO, 2015). Agriculture involves directly at least 54.1% of active population in 2014 and the poverty still affects a significant portion of the population estimated at 61.7% and the subsistence farm households are the major population that live below accepted poverty level because their dependency to the sector (AfDB, 2011).

The proportion of agricultural land is on average 59% of the total land area while arable land is estimated at only 38% of the land area. Forest covers 7.74% of the land area. Togo has a large unused farmland with only 25% of arable land under cultivation.

The economy of Togo is still peasant economy in which the family is the basic unit of production with the use of rudimentary farming tools. Most of farm households operate on limited land area and production is still very low. The average total cereal production per year is estimated at 498,307 metric tons while the cereal yield is only 0.885 tons per hectare (World Bank database). This can be explained by the lack of modernisation, the low investment in the sector as well as very low technology adoption such as drought-tolerant seeds and use of fertilizer. For instance, in Togo, the average annual application rate of fertilizer is estimated at 4.7 kilograms per hectare which is small compared to other developing countries as well as the developed countries. Low fertilizer application rate is a general observation in African countries (Morris et al., 2007; Reardon et al., 1999). For instance, fertilizer application rate in Morocco ranges from 40 to 45 Kilograms per hectare; almost 10 times that of Togo. Sometimes, the fertilizer use depends not only on agro-ecological zone but also on whether the specific crop is grown for commercial or for household’s consumption purpose.

According to FAO (2006), large-scale farmers who are often commercial farmers tend to use fertilizer optimally while it is very low for subsistence or small-scale farmers. In Zimbabwe for example, large-scale commercial farmers apply on average 290 kilograms of fertilizer per hectare while on small-scale farming, this rate is on average around 15 kilograms per hectare; 3 times that of Togolese small-scale farmers’ application rate. The low rate of fertilizer application in Togo may be explained by two factors: availability and price. It is known that not only is the fertilizer use in African agriculture very low but also the availability of fertilizer at the right time for cultivation is a major challenge, hence the ongoing debate about the benefits and drawbacks of fertilizer use in agricultural development (Morris et al., 2007; FAO, 2006; Reardon et al., 1999). Sometimes, the fertilizer price is too high for most farmers. For example, the official price of one bag of 50 Kilograms of fertilizer in Togo was on average US$15 before 2003 and in 2016, it costs about US$22 (1USD=500FCFA). This is high for subsistence farmers with very limited purchasing power and non-access to financial products leading to the use of manure. Regrettably, the application of manure is still low and yields are disappointing (Reardon et al., 1999). Different agro-ecological zones and soil type could be determinants.
Indeed, Togo has four agro-ecological zones and five major soil types according to FAO et al. (2012). Agro-ecological zones include Northern Guinea Savannah, Southern Guinea Savannah, derived savannah, and humid forest (Figure 1). The soil types comprise:

i. Lixisols which is dominant and represents 50% of all type of soil in the country (Soklou 2000). This category of soil is characterized by surface accumulation of low activity clays and high base saturation.

ii. Leptosols characterized by the shallow soils over hard rock or in unconsolidated gravelly materials; Nitisols identified by their deepness, darkness, redness, brownish, or yellowing clayey with pronounced shiny and nut-shaped structure

iii. Plinthosols which are wet with an irreversibly hardening mixture of iron, clay and quartz in the subsoil and

iv. Vertisols with dark-colored cracking and swelling clays Agronomic research needs knowledge about the characteristics of these agro ecological zones and the characteristics of the major soil types.

Diverse crops are produced in Togo depending on different agro ecological zones. The cash crops, mostly produced in Togo are cotton in the Northern regions, while coffee and cocoa are cultivated in the Southern regions. They are not processed in the country, but exported as raw materials. They contribute about 20% of total exports. Other crops that are cultivated in Togo are cereals and legumes (cowpea, soya beans, and beans) and tuber crops (yams, cassava and potatoes). The cereals contribute about 68.5% to agricultural GDP and serve as either food for home consumption or sold in the domestic market to generate income for farm households.

Over the period 1960 to 2011, the average annual contribution of Togolese agriculture to its GDP was estimated at 36.61%. It reached a maximum of 55.16% just after independence and a minimum of 24.1% the year just after the green revolution program. It reached 42.19% of GDP in 1997, 40.70% in 2008 before declining to 31.92% in 2011. Figure 3 illustrates the average annual agricultural growth from independence 1960 to 2015. The maximum annual agricultural growth reached 29.91% in 1984; the year before the launching of the second leg of the five year term of the green revolution policy. This high rate can be explained by the high investment in the sector during the first term of the green revolution policy. The lowest average annual agricultural growth was observed in 2009; the year after the world food crisis in 2008 with an average annual rate of -26.4% (Figure 3). The average annual growth rate of the agricultural sector was 3.02% between 1966 and 2011. This growth rate is far lower than the targeted goal rate that was set by the heads of States in Maputo in 2003. In Maputo round 2003, the heads of States of Africa decided that each country should allocate at least 10% of their national budget to agriculture in order to achieve at least 6% average annual agriculture growth and Togo was the first country in West Africa and the second in Sub-Saharan Africa to sign to this program in July 2009 (Bruntrup, 2011). Indeed, the public investment in agriculture in Togo is still very low. For example, prior to signing the Maputo declaration, the average public investment in agriculture was only 3.5% of the national budget, which is far from the Maputo target. According to Fan et al. (2008) the Togolese government expenditure on agriculture between 2002 and 2005, was only 2.25% of total expenditure which is below the average African governments’ agricultural expenditure growth rate from 1980 to 2005 (3.6%). This observation of low level of investment in agriculture is common to African countries compared with Asia. For instance, the average ratio of agricultural expenditures to agricultural GDP is ranged between 5 to 7 percent for African countries while it has been between 8 to 10 percent for Asian countries (Fan and Roa, 2003; Fan et al., 2009). These authors have noticed that Togo is among the countries that have considerably decrease the agricultural investment level since 1980; a year that marks the end of green revolution policy and the beginning of liberalization policy. That may heavily weigh on food security status leading to the increase of poverty level. Doubling efforts in supporting the agriculture sector through investment could increase productivity and strengthen the national economy. This can be done through a good management and implementation of adopted agricultural policies. The next section analyzes different agricultural policies in Togo.

Agricultural policies in Togo

Agricultural policies in Togo may be examined in four main periods: the period before green revolution (before 1977), the green revolution period (between 1977 and 1988); the structural adjustment period (1988-1999) and post structural adjustment period (2000-2015).

Before the green revolution in 1977, three policy targets were undertaken. First, the creation of a national credit agency in 1967 in order to provide financial products such as credit for agricultural activities; second the creation of a national office for grain products in 1971 with the main role of regulating the food crops market, specially cereals market which collapsed due to uncontrolled and much segmented market that characterized the developing countries like Togo. The third target was focused on cash crops notably cotton, coffee and cocoa production for export. The government was mainly preoccupied with the industrial sector after the national political independence in 1960, while neglecting agricultural and rural development.

Togolese “Green Revolution” and food security policies

Crop harvest was extremely low in 1976 due to climatic conditions. The agricultural annual growth of that year was negative (-6.06%). Maize production decreased by about 45% compared to that in 1975 according to the Directorate of agricultural database, Information and Documentation (data from DSID). It was difficult to get food for the entire
population particularly the urban population, because of their dependence on rural agricultural products sold through the markets. There were increased commodity prices, especially for the staple foods. In order to respond immediately to this local crisis, the head of state launched a huge program on March 7, 1977. This program which was called "Green revolution" sought to ensure food security in all areas across the country within a five-year period. Various subsector policies were undertaken to achieve the main goal. Schwartz (1989) summarizes these policies into three aspects: institutional, technical and financial.

From an institutional perspective, two ministries were created: the Ministry of Rural Equipment and Ministry of Rural Development were put in charge of formulating and implementing of green revolution policies. The regional planning and development societies (SORAD) were created and their roles were to manage the rural economic development programs at the local level. Progressively, SORAD has been substituted into the regional organizations and promotion of cereals production called OPRV and the directorate of management of rural activities and cooperative action (DRARAC) in charge of regional agricultural policies outlook. In 1985, the Directorate of regional management of rural development (DRDR) was handed over with the DRARAC functions. Other semi-public societies that were created to strengthen the existing policies were: SONAPH (National company for development of palm grove and oil-works industry) that was in charge of palm grove and oil-works, SRCC (National agency for renovation and development of Togolese cocoa and coffee sectors) in charge of coffee and cocoa; TOGOFRUIT: the company in charge of development of the fruit industry and SOTOCO (National cotton company) in charge of cotton production and trade.

An agricultural credit agency that was created in 1961 would strength the implementation of green revolution policy and give opportunity to the stakeholders to do their jobs efficiently. Unfortunately, this agency collapsed in 1987 as a result of great misappropriation that was discovered (Schwartz, 1989). The government also launched a national solidarity tax of 5% applied on the salary of all private and public sector workers in order to sustain the financial burden for project implementation. Cereals export was officially banned. This strategy, which seeks to supply food across the country, collapsed as a result of small, uncontrolled and much segmented market.

On the technical aspect, various strategies were undertaken to achieve the green revolution objectives. For example, the promotion of mechanized agriculture which had the purpose of modernizing Togolese agriculture was launched. Agricultural modernisation favours intensive farming systems, increases production and decreases the hardships faced by farmers in their activities and gain in terms of time and labour use (Reardon et al., 1999). In that sense, modernized agricultural tools such as tractors, sowing machines or planters, bulldozers were imported.
The institutions in charge trained farmers on the use of these tools. Unfortunately most of the machines broke down a year after their arrival. Animal traction had played an important role in the Northern regions, especially in Kara and Savannah regions, where those who adopted the techniques of animal traction can be found. The animal traction equipment was provided by the promotion of animal traction project on national scale since 1982. To date, the animal traction equipment is provided by UPROMA (Agricultural Tools Production Unit) situated in Kara and recently in Dapaong. The livestock development strategy was to increase livestock production. This strategy was accompanied by veterinary service provision.

Another key strategy was the promotion of the use of modern agricultural inputs in order to increase productivity. The crop improvement and study centre was thus created in 1977 at Sotouboua, located in central region of Togo. Till today, this centre is in charge of seeds production and improvement of some crops such as maize, rice, groundnut, sorghum and soya bean. The promotion and the use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides was also part of this policy. There were some trained people for example, extension officers, engaged in rural areas whose role was to advice farmers on the use of modern agricultural inputs. The Young Farmers’ Training Centre was created to train extension officers as well as young volunteers. It trained at least 419 young men and women (Schwartz, 1989). This service no longer exists because of lack of financial resource to support the training officers and the young volunteers.

Another important sub-policy that was launched to achieve the green revolution targets was the redistribution of non-occupied lands in 1980. The landownership has become a problematic in rural areas. Sometimes, it is only two or three hectare of land is available for a farmer for his activities. In order to respond to these issues, the government has launched the land redistribution policy as part of the strategy of green revolution policy. For instance, the redistribution of land in Doufegou (Agbassa) district was successful. The land redistribution policy was designed so that the young men and women who were ready to involve themselves in agricultural activities were each given on average five hectares with a flat for their habitation. These farmers also benefited from agricultural extension services provided by extension officers of the regional development programs under ministries in charge of agriculture.

The promotion of agro-food industry whose purpose was to transform the local agricultural product was also launched in 1982 in order to satisfy local demand and also exports. An example is cassava processing business which collapsed because of low productivity due to climatic conditions. An oil-works set at Canaveli in the South East was then substituted for the cassava processing industry. In 1988, the groundnut industry also collapsed because the supply price decreased significantly and there were not enough incentives for farmers to produce groundnut. Again, 3,500 hectares of cashew nut plantation and 1,250 hectares of sugar cane plantation were launched respectively at Kara and Anié. The, cashew nut industry at Kara in the Northern region and the sugar cane industry at Anié in the central region were promoted in 1977. These projects were undertaken in partnership with the Republic of China.

In terms of public investment during the green revolution period, a lot of effort was made. Schwartz (1989) indicated some interesting statistics. The average investment rate in agriculture reached 11.9% of total public investment between 1976 and 1980, the first term of five-year program of green revolution. During the second five-year term of green revolution, the investment efforts were doubled and reached 25.3% of total public investment between 1981 and 1983. The high spike of investment in agriculture reached 33.1% in 1985. Between 1986 and 1988, the agricultural investment share in total public investment was on average 29.9%. These investments were significant compared to the investment share in the industrial sector, the most targeted sector before the green revolution and during the first term of green revolution. The investment in the industrial sector was 21.8% between 1971 and 1975, reached a peak of about 50.7% between 1976 and 1980 and declined to only 8% in 1985.

Post Green Revolution Policies

The post green revolution policies in Togo are characterized by structural adjustment program (SAP). The reforms advocated by the structural adjustment program can be grouped into two phases: macro level policy reforms and sectoral level policy reforms. The macro level reforms comprise the currency devaluation and trade liberalization. The sectoral level policy reforms include removal of fertilizer and seeds subsidies, removal of marketing subsidies for crop outputs as well as the reduction of farm input financial services subsidies (Dieng, 2006; AfDB, 2000; Reardon et al., 1999).

However, it becomes important to ask the following question: Why SAP? What can we learn from the implementation of SAP in Togo? More specially, what was SAP contribution to Togolese agriculture? Was SAP evidence-based in African agricultural policy making? What was the evidence of Togo?

The following section highlights the agricultural policies undertaken under SAP and discusses the successes and failures in the context of Togo by answering the above questions.

Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and agricultural policies

The SAP aimed at strengthening the national economies that faced serious imbalance due to the instability of export commodities prices. According to Bond (1983), the average agricultural growth rate was very low, even negative in most of Sub-Saharan African countries between 1962 and 1981 due to macroeconomic instability as well as unobserved reinvestment in agricultural sector as a result
of non-market liberalization. Indeed, the governments in sub-Saharan countries that have the monopoly of selling the export crops were likely to use their export earnings to finance other public sectors activities rather than agriculture. Under these conditions, there could be an asymmetry between producers’ prices and world prices because the governments are the buyers in the national market while sellers in the international market. In the long run, there could be no incentives in export crops supply because the producers are the losers given the fact that the national prices are not reflected in international market prices. How to increase producers’ prices that could lead to the stimulation of agricultural production and shape farmers’ income goals was the critical question for which the implementation of SAP was supposed to respond. High rate of inflation and unemployment, the expansion of external debt, overvalue of exchange rate, high industrial protection, greater proportion of inputs subsidies are also other reasons for SAP implementation in developing countries (Ekpo, 1992; Binswanger, 1989).

The SAP was implemented for the first time in Togo in 1988 (AfDB, 2000). It was launched in three phases. The policy reforms step I, was implemented between 1988 and 1990. The second step of policy reforms implementation was between 1992 and 1996, and the third SAP implementation between 1996 and 1999.

The SAP I implementation in Togo targeted agriculture, industry and commerce. Its aim was to promote the private sector and achieve on average 3% of economic growth annually. The results of the implementation of SAP I, was not satisfactory. AfDB (2000) indicates that the dissatisfaction of SAP I was due to non-involvement of all stakeholders into the program design.

The SAP II phase dealt with the stabilization of external balance, the rationalization of public finance and moderate inflation rate down to 3% in order to raise real GDP growth. However, the implementation of SAP II faced time inconsistency. It was supposed to have been undertaken between 1992 and 1994, but the effectiveness of SAP II covered the period from 1992 to 1996. The reasons given for this late implementation were the social and political unrest that Togo experienced during that period. Also, the nine months general strike in 1992 in Togo can be cited as the main reason for time inconsistency in the implementation of SAP II phase. Therefore, the 94 measures in the agenda of SAP II were not fully implemented hence the renewal of some measures during SAP III. The third step of the structural adjustment program (SAP III) comprised 57 measures to restore macroeconomic stability as indicated by AfDB (2000). The economic growth reached 5.5% annually and exports recorded an average of 8.5% growth while inflation was not moderate (5%).

The conclusions about the effects of the implementation of the structural adjustment program on African countries’ economies are not homogeneous. Some impact evaluation researchers find benefits from SAP implementation, while others judge the impacts as negative.

According to the World Trade Organization-WTO (1999), Togolese economy performed well as a result of the economic reforms. One expectation from macroeconomic reforms policy such as the devaluation of currency is to reduce imports. This was implemented in the context of Togo with fixed exchange rate regime compared to other countries like Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone with flexible exchange rate regime (Ekpo, 1992). If exports meant earning more foreign exchange due to domestic currency devaluation effects, the exports of manufactured or semi-manufactured goods could be more beneficial than exporting raw materials.

Binswanger (1989) has indicated that SAP slowed the domestic food supply and therefore should do more beyond the stabilization of the balance of payment. According to Ekpo (1992), in general, all West African countries including Togo performed badly during SAP implementation. The economic performances are still disappointing when comparing before and during SAP implementation. Ekpo (1992) states: “The IMF and World Bank institutions operate as if adjustments are carried out on stones and trees....It is very important to consider the end result of policy, and such feedback must inform the policymakers about the effectiveness of their actions .”

Perhaps he was right in the sense that policy adoption and implementation was not based on evidence. One way to choose the best policy, to achieve effective and efficient objectives is to base policy on evidence. The evidence based policy making must be accurate, credible, relevant and feasible and should include rational analysis that helps policymakers to understand the environment in which the policy is implemented. All stakeholders must be involved. The target population is not often involved in the process and the policies fail as a result.

The SAP implementation in developing countries may not also have taken into account the role of political institutions which mostly operates under time pressure, cultural concepts as well as political and social unrest. This was evident in Togo during the implementation of SAP phases I and II.

Yet, the voting model in policy adoption is problematic. Parliamentarians may vote for policy adoption even though they do not understand it perfectly; it is sufficient to align behind the majority in parliament. For these reasons, any choice of agricultural policy in developing countries should be based on evidence, debates, and research rather than the voting principle. Apart from political and social dimensions (Heidhues, 2009), we argue also that, the failure of SAP implementation in Togo like elsewhere in African countries is due to the lack of good services, the weakness of institutions, the lack of efficiency in services, and by the way that policy drivers come to State power, and carelessness in policy-making process and negotiation. These elements are the most common characteristics in the developing world. Other authors like Anderson (2000) and Anderson and Hoekman (2000), point out that the best way to address African economic issues is to directly tackle market failure rather than taking indirect measures through trade restriction. The evidence in the case of Togo
is that exports under SAP implementation substantially decreased (Ekpo, 1992). Also, too much attention was given to the cash crops at the expense of food crops that are mostly grown by small-scale farmers, while restrictive policies were applied on all of them. There were inconsistencies between target crops and applied policies hence the bias implementation of SAP. For instance, Koffi-Tessio (2000) emphasized that the price incentive policy contained in the SAP package did not positively influence cotton supply before and during SAP implementation in Togo. Surprisingly, his results using an error correction model indicate the substitution in long run between cotton and maize during the SAP, while they were complementary before the SAP. The trend of maize and sorghum prices in comparison of cotton price have influenced the cotton supply over the period of study. As a result, the cotton producers in maize production areas seem to substitute maize to cotton when maize price is becoming higher compared to cotton price over time. However, cotton supply in the study in Northern Togo was positively influenced by investment and therefore, the public investment in cotton cultivation is recommended even if it is in opposition to SAP sub-target that advocates public investment limitation in agriculture.

**Post SAP and agricultural policy**

The period from 2000 to 2015 was characterized by the strategy of upturn of agricultural production. How to feed the Togolese population, improve producers’ incomes, gain from the foreign exchange and create jobs remained the main concern of Togolese policymakers. They still believe that improving the agricultural productivity of small-holder farmers can play an important role in poverty alleviation and meet the Sustainable Development Goal No.1 by 2030 that seeks to end poverty in all forms and dimension by increasing the access of basic resources and services with targeting the most vulnerable communities affected by conflicts and climate-related disasters (Heidhues, 2004; DESA, 2016). The essence of this new strategy is called “new vision of Togo 2030”. To meet this goal, Togolese policymakers launched some projects: Programme d’Appui au Development Agricole au Togo (PADAT) financed by the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) to strengthen agricultural development; Projet d’Appui au Secteur Agricole which is financed by the World Bank. Both projects (PADAT and PASA) are part of the national program of investment for food security project (PNiASA) that seeks to meet the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) target, that is, the increase of agricultural annual growth rate, of at least, 6% per annum (Kibaara et al., 2009). These projects aim at improving maize, rice and cassava production as well as strengthening small ruminants and poultry production. They also seek to enhance producers’ capacity building and organizations at local, national as well as regional level. Thus, Togolese national farmers’ forum has been launched in 2009. The first edition in 2009 counted 4250 producers and over 5500 participants was launched and the 7th edition held at Atakpamé in 2015 (Plateau region) and the 8th edition held in Kara region in 2016. From 2013 to 2017, Togo expects to increase cereals production by 4.5% per year, 3% for tuber crops, 1.38% for meat and 4.5% for fishery in order to respond to food insecurity issues (FAO and MAEF, 2012).

**Agricultural trade policy**

The agricultural trade policy depends on whether it is cash crop or food crop. The main cash crops are cotton, coffee and cocoa while the food crops comprise cereals and grain legumes (mainly maize, sorghum, rice, groundnut, millet, soya beans, and beans) and tuber crops such as yams, potatoes and cassava.

The liberalization policy discussed in previous sections has increased the number of private exporters in cocoa and coffee. In the case of cotton, its production and marketing was implemented by the Togolese Cotton Company (Société Togolaise de Coton) known today as New Cotton Society of Togo (Nouvelle Société Cotonnière du Togo-NSCT). All these cash crops are exported as raw material. As a member of World Trade Organization since May 31st, 1995, Togo has benefited from exemptions of certain provisions. Beyond that, Togo expects to take advantage to diversify its production and earn more from export as a result of implementation of liberalization. Generally, the value-added tax is exempted on agricultural and fisheries inputs as well as limiting certain taxes on agricultural products as required under the Uruguay Round.

Cereals and tuber crops are mostly produced for households’ consumption and the deficit in their production is filled by imports. The main problem is the storage and packaging in agro-food trade in Togo; causing households to sell their products cheaply during the harvest periods and buy at high prices in food shortage periods. This observation and the world food crisis of 2007 and 2008 as well as the flooding which occurred in these years, caused the Togolese government to launch a public stockholding program under National Food Security Agency (ANSAT). The government gives financial support to ANSAT through the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Fisheries, to buy farmers’ products, mainly cereals at the market price during the harvest periods, store and resell it at a lower price when future market price increases. This policy comes to slow down the increase of cereals prices and that can allow the vulnerable households to survive the inflation effects until the market’s prices come down. The ANSAT program aim at constituting buffer stock that stabilize cereal prices and protects both consumers (when cereals’ prices spike) and producers (when cereals’ prices drop). This policy may need to be assessed as it does not mean automatic price stabilization. Public stockholding policy may lead to large direct and opportunity cost in its implementation, leading to a conflict between the objective of food security and consumers price stabilization target (OECD, 2014). By taking an example of African and Asian...
countries, OECD (2014) has emphasized that public stockholding policies influence market prices significantly, if and only if, the specific country that implements the policy is able to insulate its own economy from the world market. This cannot be observed in the case of Togo. The argument is that the international trade pools production risks, offering more price stability. Future research that aims to assess the impact of public stockholding on food security is needed for better orientation of food security and price stabilization strategies in Togo.

Yet, the quality of transportation infrastructure mostly in rural areas for better movement of agricultural commodities is questionable. It has been indicated that there is a strong link between transportation infrastructure and agricultural development (Moisé et al., 2013). For example, Koffi-Tessio et al. (2007) have indicated that transportation cost remains high given transportation infrastructure quality in rural areas in Togo. These authors concluded that, to make farmers' products accessible to local markets and ensure the effectiveness of food security policies, there is a need for improvement in transportation infrastructure quality in Togo. In recent years, a lot of efforts have been devoted by Togolese policymakers in collaboration with the government of China to increase the transport network at the local and national levels.

Environmental policy

The natural environment in Togo is critical and suffers from physical degradation (Koffi-Tessio, 2004). There are three types of environmental degradation. Togo has been ranked first among the West African countries with an alarming rate of forest degradation because of its 5.5% rate of total degradation per year (FAO, 2010). Other types of degradation are the costal degradation and soil degradation which are more accentuated in the Northern regions. The study by Yendoukoa (2008) has shown that 54.2% of soil degradation is observed in the Northern region of Togo. The environment and soil degradation effects on agricultural production are well recognized and therefore, there is a need for integrated soil management technology to address food insecurity issues in the context of West African countries (Fairhead and Scoones, 2005; Thampapillai and Anderson, 1994; Koning et al., 2001; Koffi-Tessio and Homevor, 2006). The environmental policy in Togo dates from the colonial periods. Hunting, wildlife and fauna were regulated since 1968. The bush fires were also regulated. Bush fires start in November and end in January. The environmental policy in Togo aims at ensuring the global and rational management of the environment for better life for all population from the sustainable development perspective (MERF, 2011). The targets of Togolese environmental policies can be summarized into three main headings:

1. National development plans should include the environmental angle through the framework of National Action Plan for the environment. The aim is to improve the environmental management and this ultimate objective should therefore be included in any national development plan. This could be achieved throughout the public and private agencies as well as NGOs.
2. Focus on the reduction of both the pressure on natural resources and negative environmental impacts on public and private sector development programs.
3. Strengthen national capacity building in terms of natural resources and environmental management. In the face of climate change and variability problem, some practical actions have been undertaken. For example, from 2009 to 2011, 8000 hectares of forests have been reforested and 15000 hectares of state forest were preserved.

Lessons learnt

Five key lessons can be highlighted from the discussion on the above policies:

1. The weakness of institutions in the implementation of agricultural policies and the lack of efficiency in the management of available resources. A typical example is the Togolese green revolution policy.
2. Evidence-based policymaking process is sometimes neglected and the target population is often not involved. An example is the structural adjustment program implementation in Togo. The stakeholders should be given a chance to influence the coverage of the policy so that its implementation can be easier and more successful.
3. The engagement in agricultural investment is insufficient. To go forward, policymakers in Togo must be re-sensitized on the Sustainable Development Goals, the CAADP objectives, and targets in order to homogenize their understanding about the strong link between investment, research, agriculture and poverty.
4. The shift of political economy needed to overcome anti-agricultural policies biases in the development agenda and restore the role of agriculture in Togo is not observed. The selection of agricultural policies is not based on debate and discussions.
5. Today, 86,000 hectares of land are available for irrigation. On average, only 2.3% of them are exploited. No policy has been undertaken to expand the area under irrigation in order to maintain the production in all seasons. Yet irrigation practices remain important and a useful strategy toward food security.

Conclusion

This paper has reviewed diverse agricultural policies that have been undertaken by Togolese policymakers to respond to food insecurity issues since independence. It highlights their effectiveness and gives direction to the future policies. The green revolution policy launched in the aftermath of independence in 1977 could have resulted in the upswing of Togolese agriculture, but the weaknesses of institutions...
in charge of its implementation and management and the carelessness in the policy process and corruption led to its failure. The inconsistency of policies can be explained by the lack of knowledge of return on investment. The Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) came to save the country's economy after the green revolution policy failure. The liberalization policy (SAP) advocated the gradual reduction in the overall level of agricultural support. Once again, this policy failed, because its implementation was not based on evidence in the case of developing countries like Togo. The strategies of reduction of the distortionary impact of agricultural support were not well defined.

Also, the social and cultural concepts were not taken into account in the case of Togo. The political conditions from 1990 to 2010 leading to social unrest brought down all investment opportunities in the sector. The impacts of the recent world food crisis gave important lessons to Togolese policymakers, paving the way for the implementation of new strategies towards sustainable development in a healthier environment.

A good policy needs to include the monitoring and evaluation systems. The evidence-based policy making process must be followed by Togolese policymakers and public institutions. There is a need for sufficient financial resources and human capacity building for conducive policy formulation and implementation. Togo’s food systems like elsewhere in Africa often exclude the majority of those who are involved in the food production system. This is another factor that explains agricultural policy failures in Togo. Effective policy implementation needs the involvement of all sectors such as the target population, the private sector, the parliamentary representatives, the non-governmental organizations, the researchers, the consultants, and women as well. Each of them has a voice in determining policies that could affect everyone's lives. Togolese government must look at its investment share in agriculture and invest at least 10% of its budget as agreed in Maputo in 2003. The review of management and competitiveness of some sectors like cotton, coffee and cocoa is recommended. As for food and tuber crops, motivating their processing, as well as the review of fertilizer supply and distribution chains could enhance productivity. Food security must be the “mother” of all kinds of security in Togo. The policies that support the smallholder agriculture on which the most vulnerable population depend are one sure way to reach food security and food sovereignty, and alleviate poverty in Togo. This needs a good political environment and peace, as was the case of some Eastern Asian countries.

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Conflict of interests

The author declare that there is no conflicting interests

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